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         Abstract 
 
The “science wars” of recent decades have largely subsided, giving way to what might be viewed as a 
condition of reflective pragmatism. However, the prevailing metaphor underlying most research across the 
social sciences remains that of the “mirror.” That is, even while conscious of its biases, researchers 
continue the attempt to reflect, explore, illuminate, or describe aspects of individual or social life.  After 
considering some of the shortcomings of the prevailing practices, I offer an alternative to the mirror 
metaphor, one that defines the researcher in terms of world-making. By this I mean an orientation to 
inquiry in which the major attempt is not to assay the world for what it is, but to actively shape the 
contours of the future. A future forming orientation is especially invited by the increasingly rapid 
fluctuations in social life, and represents an alternative to the prevailing tradition and its unclear 
consequences for society. Shifting from a view of knowledge as propositional, to one of knowledge as 
praxis – or practical “knowing how” – I discuss research in a future forming direction, including critical 
inquiry, the creation of new practices, and collaborative action. Attention is also given to the role of 
theory, and to a relational ethic of research.  





















To foreshadow the direction of this offering, one might usefully reflect on the contribution of the past 
century of social science research to society and to the world. From the hundreds of thousands of 
studies – the countless hours of devotion by talented and educated professionals – what has resulted? 
What new policies, practices, or forms of daily life have emerged? Have our traditional practices of 
research added significantly to human wellbeing? With these questions lingering in the margins of what 
follows, I begin here with the recent, intense, and wide-ranging discussions of the nature of scientific 
truth. Within the social sciences these discussions have left a trail of misunderstandings, animosities, 
and an increasing divide between traditionalists and those variously termed “post-foundationalist,” 
“post-empiricist,” and “post-modern”.  It is not my intention to review the vast body of literature 
surrounding these issues, nor to resolve the remaining tensions. Rather, in what follows I shall first 
bring into focus what appear to be some of the most widely recognized outcomes of these debates – 
often drawing support from both critics and defenders of tradition. With these in hand, I shall extend 
the logics implicit in these conclusions to explore an emergent conception of what it is to conduct 
research within the human or social sciences.  Here I will point to significant shortcomings of widely 
shared traditions, both conceptual and pragmatic. I will then outline the potentials of what I see as a far 
more promising alternative. This conception of a future forming orientation to research opens the way 
to new aims, practices, ethical deliberations, and reflections. My intent in this case is not to eliminate 
the longstanding traditions, but to bring into focus new and far-reaching potentials of inquiry.   
 
   The Emergence of a Reflective Pragmatism 
 
For over 50 years now social scientists have joined with scholars across the humanities and natural 
sciences in dialogue and debate on the extent to which our common practices of establishing knowledge 
embody the traditional ideals of objectivity and truth. Wide-ranging critiques based on the value saturation 
of knowledge claims, their literary and rhetorical dependency, and their social (as opposed to empirical) 
origins, have virtually eliminated the quest for a foundational philosophy of science. Called into question 
is nothing less than the legacy of the Enlightenment and the rational foundations of science. Yet, within 
the social sciences we find the vitriolic controversies of the so-called “science wars” have largely 
subsided. Putting aside those enclaves that simply remained oblivious, this mellowing may be traced both 
to a broad resistance (both conceptual and practical) to the extreme forms of critique and defense, and to a 
growing acceptance of some of the less nihilistic critiques. In effect there are several lines of critique that, 
in their less antagonistic form, have become relatively uncontroversial. Agreement on these assumptions 
does allow a place for traditional lines of research, although qualified in significant respects. I would 
characterize this emerging consensus as a reflective pragmatism (Gergen, 2014). Most important for the 
present undertaking, lying implicit within these assumptions is the rationale for a radical departure from 
traditional orientations to research. After describing the emerging position, I will take up the more 
challenging implications for research.  
 The two most widely shared assumptions lending themselves to a reflective pragmatism are as 
follows: 
 Whatever exists makes no necessary requirements on representation.  One of the most contentious 
sticking points in the ongoing debates concerns the extent to which our accounts of the world can be 
driven or determined by events in the world. On the one side is the empiricist tradition, holding that 
descriptions of the world are “data driven,” and can be corrected and improved through observation. On 
the other are numerous scholars from across the social sciences holding that without something akin to a 
theoretical (or linguistic) forestructure, there are no meaningful observations. In effect, theory determines 
what count as data. Putting side the extremities of these positions (e.g. naïve empiricism vs. linguistic 
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reductionism), there is one way of phrasing the issue about which most social scientists would agree. That 
is, whatever we take to be the world does not demand or require any particular form of representation (e.g. 
utterances, markings, movements, signals, or graphics). At its most banal, this is simply to point out that 
there are many different ways to describe or otherwise represent whatever is before us. With Saussure 
(1916) it is to point to the culturally situated character of the relationships between signifier and signified. 
With Quineau (1981) it is to acknowledge the multiple ways one might describe what we might otherwise 
call “the same situation.” More interestingly it is to propose (with Kant) that it is not only space and time 
that cannot be derived from experience, but indeed, that experience alone would not demand such common 
words as “desk” and “chair”.  A second conciliatory assumption follows the first. 
 What stands as objective truth can be established within a research tradition.  A significant tension 
between traditionalists  and their critics concerns the presumption that scientific research enables us to 
make progress toward objective truth. Traditionalists  draw support from the manifest achievements of the 
physical sciences, while critics assail the traditional concepts “progress”, “objectivity”, and “truth”.  
However, by recognizing the useful outcomes of the physical science research, combined with a 
relinquishing of the strong claims to foundations, a viable middle ground has been achieved. With the 
mutual understanding that the relationship between world and word is negotiable, there is broad accord 
that useful agreements can be reached on the character of what exists. Without philosophic justification, 
daily life effortlessly proceeds if we agree to index this as “an apple” and that as “an orange”.  More 
formally, Berger and Luckmann (1967) would say that the social order depends importantly on sedimented 
understandings. With Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of the habitus, it is to recognize the common-sense 
structures of everyday life – including concepts, practices, and artifacts.      
 Most importantly, while the naming of the real cannot be justified through the act of reference, it is 
this very sedimentation of social understandings that permits the communities of science to achieve what 
we ordinarily view as progress. With Kuhn (1962), it is to say that once there is a shared paradigm 
(metaphysical, ontological, and practical), the sciences become productive. Only then can we split atoms, 
place a man on the moon, or eliminate smallpox. By the same token, it is possible for sociologists to make 
predictions about population shifts, economists to predict the effects of government policy on economic 
growth, or psychologists to predict the likelihood of criminal recidivism – all subject to falsification. This 
argument applies as well to the more interpretively based social sciences. While there may be no ultimate 
truth testing in hermeneutically informed inquiry, there can be relatively high levels of agreement within 
circumscribed enclaves about the character of subjective life.  By the same token, within circumscribed 
traditions of understanding, it is possible to test hypotheses, or to write objective history, falsifiable 
ethnography, and accurate accounts of inter-group hostility.  
 With broad agreement in these two assumptions, the contentious atmosphere of recent decades has 
begun to subside. As Wertz (2011) has put it, there is an emerging a quite robust spirit of pluralism. We 
need not lose ourselves in the internecine combat over foundations, nor do we make claims to transcendent 
or God’s eye truth. Rather, we can accept all forms of research – from laboratory experimentation to single 
case interpretation – in our work. It is indeed this spirit of pluralism that has fueled the enormous 
expansion in qualitative research practices. Denzin and Lincoln’s pivotal volume, The handbook of 
qualitative research was first published in 1994. Yet, by casting aside the authority of foundations, the 
range of research methods burgeoned, such that by 2011 the work had gone through four new editions. As 
a result of these developments, few researchers now ask about the capacity of research to yield socially 
uninflected truth. Rather, reflection moves from issues of philosophic grounding to social utility. Because 
all research practices can be legitimated in their own terms, the question then becomes one of outcomes. 
What does the research ultimately contribute to the world more generally? And this question is 
accompanied by a critical concern with politics and ideology. For whom are the outcomes useful, and in 
what way; who is benefited, who may be harmed; and who is absent from the discussion? We have, then, a 
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pragmatism with a social conscience.   
 There is much to be said in favor of this condition of relative accord. However, lingering in the 
wings, there is a dulling sense of the eternal return of the same. Traditional practices of research remain 
unchallenged; and while there is an impressive accretion in the range of practices, they do little to violate 
or challenge the basic structure of inquiry.  Most important for present purposes, this condition of 
reflective pragmatism sustains an ocularcentric conception of knowledge (Levin, 1993; Kavanagh, 2004). 
That is, the vast share of these research practices carry with them a dualist premise, distinguishing between 
the world on the one side and the observer on the other. The process of observation is essentially visual as 
opposed, for example, to tactile or auditory. Metaphorically, then, the process of research is effectively 
one of watching, looking, or seeing. As Rorty (1979) and others have characterized the process, the mind 
of the researcher ideally functions as a mirror of nature. The traditional means of safeguarding research 
from bias –inter-observer reliability, double-blind methodologies, standardized questions, large samples, 
and the like – thus function to “cleanse the mirror”. In this metaphorical vein, we may characterize the 
researcher as a mirror holder. As an instrument, the researcher cleans the mirror and holds it steady so that 
it may function without interference.  
 I am not proposing that there is broad acceptance of the metaphor itself; indeed it has been the 
subject of significant critique. However, as debates over the grounds of inquiry are abandoned in favor of a 
pluralist pragmatics, the traditional form of research remains largely unchallenged. While the metaphor is 
no longer commanding, its vestiges remain solid. Thus, the vast share of research today remains dedicated 
to “revealing,” “illuminating,” “understanding,” or “reflecting,” a given states of affairs. To sample across 
a wide spectrum, we are variously informed, that “this research tests the proposition that…” (Koenig & 
Eagly, 2014), “These findings provide preliminary evidence for …” (Scott & Weems, 2013), “This 
research examined how…” (Ingrids, 2014), and “The purpose of this study is to explore the experience 
of…” (McDonald, Pietsch, & Wilson, 2010).  In my view, this ocularcentric tradition severely constrains 
the capacities of the social sciences.  Further, if we extend the implications of the assumptions previously 
described, we can locate a radically new vision of research and its potentials.  
 
      Constatives,  Performatives, and Consequences 
 
In his groundbreaking work, How to do things with words, J.L. Austin (1962) drew the famous distinction 
between constative and performative utterances. The former refer to statements of fact, essentially 
falsifiable through observation (e.g. The cat is on the mat.), and the latter to statements that in themselves 
bring about changes in existing states of affairs (e.g. Run for your life!) Austen was himself quick to 
illuminate the impurities of the distinction, a point on which many philosophers and literary theorists have 
since expanded. Most important for present purposes, many scholars – including Austen himself – points 
to the possibility that all constatives - at least by implication - can be understood as performative. This 
possibility is most clearly applicable to the social sciences. In a classic illustration of a performative: “I 
name this ship ‘the Queen Elizabeth’,” the act of naming has consequences for subsequent actions. In the 
same way, as social scientists go about describing the nature of  “aggression,” “mental illness,” “suicide,” 
and the like, they are “naming” or “dubbing” those under study in ways that invite our actions toward them 
- curtailing their aggression, treating mental illness, preventing suicide, and so on. Such consequences 
were indeed the focus of early “labeling” studies of social deviance (see, for example, Gove, 1975)   
 Nor is this consequential character of social science description limited only to value saturated 
language, such as the above. As Peter Winch (1958) once wrote, “Since understanding something involves 
understanding its contradiction, someone who, with understanding, performs X must be capable of 
envisioning the possibility of doing not X”(p. 89). By implication, this is to say that any research that 
purports to describe human behavior, also establishes the grounds for possible action (or resistance). To 
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know about a given form of behavior, is to envision the possibility of its being done (or not). Thus, to 
learn about the range of sexual practices in which people engage (Szuchman & Muscarella, 2000) is to 
open new options for one’s own activities; to read an historical account of the cultural basis for a mother’s 
love for her offspring (Badinter, 1981) is to free mothers of guilt for moments of indifference to their own 
children. 
 In certain respects the point I am making fits congenially into the account of reflective pragmatism 
outlined above. Constative utterances are essential within any scientific community to carry out their 
activities. In this sense, they have important pragmatic value and simultaneously sustain the shared values 
of the community. What is added here is the way in which these “reality-posits” and their attendant values 
play out as they are shared with the culture more broadly. In effect, in their descriptions of human activity, 
communities of social science have the capacity to transform the society more generally. 
 These proposals are foreshadowed in earlier writing, both my own (Gergen, 1973) and that of Ian 
Hacking (2000). In my earlier work I discussed the difficulty of separating description from prescription in 
social psychology, and described what I called enlightenment effects to account for the way in which 
exposure to scientists’ accounts of social behavior could alter patterns of behavior in society. Because the 
conduct of science can transform its subject matter, I argued, social psychology is not so much an 
accumulative or progressive science as it is historical. Hacking (2000) later referred to looping effects to 
account for the way in which morally saturated descriptors in the social science can alter social 
understanding and resulting patterns of cultural life. Yet, in these writings, neither Hacking nor I move 
beyond critical analysis. For both of us the outcome was that of situating social science knowledge in 
historical context. We failed to explore the productive possibilities. 
 In what follows I wish to expand the implications of these enlightenment or looping effects to 
develop a more pro-active vision of the potentials for social science inquiry. Rather than acknowledging 
such effects in the service of a more reflective view of the sciences, a case will be made for research as a 
future forming practice – a practice in which social change is indeed the primary goal. Before exploring 
the potentials of this view, it is useful to underscore the limits and dangers of research as mirror.  
 
The Captivating Gaze  
 
As proposed, if there is local agreement among researchers in a descriptive or interpretive language, along 
with referential practices and methodological procedures, researchers may indeed contribute to the 
community of which they are a part. And if there is a public that shares in these agreements, they too may 
find benefit in the outcomes of research. Thus, with agreements in place, research on economic outcomes, 
migration trajectories, and the evaluation of healthcare programs, for example, could have significant 
social utility. Similarly, under conditions of common accord, narrative research can illuminate the 
suffering of the oppressed, phenomenology can give us insight into the experience of loneliness, and 
conversation analysis can give us insights into the structure of conversation. Practically speaking, we 
should not dispense with the tradition.  At the same time, there are inimical consequences for both the 
human sciences and the societies they serve. Shared agreements are essentially captivating. And in 
significant degree, the captivating gaze simultaneously constrains the imagination and numbs the 
sensitivity to consequences.  
 At the outset, the very agreements essential to moving forward with a research endeavor are, in 
effect, ontologically and culturally preserving. That is, they sustain existing traditions of indexing the 
world along with the forms of life in which they are embedded.  One may comfortably launch research 
into the causes of prejudice, aggression, human happiness, aging, and so on because these are commonly 
shared terms for understanding the world. One could scarcely locate support for research on liget or chan 
because within the West, such terms are culturally opaque. To illuminate, reflect, or understand a given 
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state of affairs, sustains a tradition in which this “state of affairs” has acquired ontological status. Or, one 
might say, in conducting research on what exists, we lend inertia to conventional forms of life. We do not 
readily ask about what does not yet exist, or about ways of life that could be created. In effect, the 
mirroring tradition of research favors the maintenance of the status quo.  
 These same limits to the imagination also interfere with the researcher’s understanding of research 
consequences. Here my concern is with the enlightenment or looping effects of inquiry on the society at 
large. How, for example, does research on the neural basis of altruism, on the trajectory of grief, or the 
positive consequences of optimism affect the logics and patterns of cultural life? As researchers concretize 
a given reality – along with concomitant values and forms of action – they are ill prepared to explore or 
appreciate points of view that challenge the ontology. It would be difficult for researchers focused on the 
decline of mental abilities with aging to embrace a theory of aging as a period of growth and development, 
or for researchers on child abuse to tolerate the opinions of the Man/Boy Love Association. Perhaps the 
most striking example of this intransigence is furnished by research into mental illness. In the late 1930s 
the newly emerging psychiatric profession shared a nosology of some 40 terms for diagnosing mental 
illness, and the healthcare costs for mentally illness were unremarkable. With the advanced visibility of the 
profession and with government supported efforts to expand public consciousness, by 1950 there were 1.6 
million patient-care episodes. Categories of mental illness continued to increase, and by 2000 there were 
some 350 ways of defining oneself as mentally ill. The number of patient-care episodes jumped to 10.7 
million (Whitaker, 2010). With additional support from the pharmaceutical industry, mental illness 
expenditures now compete with heart disease and cancer. Yet, in spite of intensive critique of diagnostics 
and pharmaceutical “cures” from across the professional and public spectrum, the psychiatric profession 
has continued its efforts without pause. Mental illness is, after all, an object of scientific research. And 
thus the gaze solidifies its object.  
 
From Mirroring to Making 
 
Given the limits of the mirroring metaphor of research, I return to the issue of consequences. As I have 
proposed, when research commences with an “object of study” the result is an extension of existing 
traditions, and suppression of alternative realities. The social imaginary is circumscribed. But, we may ask, 
what if we suspended the mirror metaphor, and its invitation to study that which captivates the gaze? 
Metaphorically speaking, what if we closed our eyes and began to imagine the worlds of our hopes? What 
if we replaced the persistent rush to establish “what is the case” and began to ask, “what kind of world 
could we build”? This would be to place the researcher’s values in the forefront of his/her activities. 
Rather than their latent presence in the choice of terminology and methodology, and in the vain hopes that 
an absent audience will somehow make use of one’s work, what if purposeful and passionate visions 
supplied the source of inquiry? Given a valued vision of the possible, the challenge for research would be 
to explore how such a possibility could be realized. The aim of research would not be to illuminate what 
is, but to create what is to become. Herein lies the essence of a future forming orientation to research. 
 There are resonances here with a rich array of existing ideas. In a certain sense, this is to extend the 
Aristotelian concept of knowledge through praxis. Where the pursuit of knowledge through theoria is to 
establish an articulated truth, knowledge through praxis is achieved through and represented within 
ongoing action. In contemporary educational circles the distinction is represented in the contrast between 
propositional and procedural knowledge, where the latter is implicit, unformalized, and realized through 
accomplishment.  Also relevant is the Socratic concept of episteme, or knowledge embedded in the active 
accomplishment of a goal, with techne representing the craft-like ability to make or perform. In a slightly 
different register, Arendt’s (1958) critique of philosophy as unduly contemplative (vita contemplativa), 
and thus withdrawn from human affairs, is relevant. As she hoped, philosophy could become more fully 
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engaged in projects of social change. For her, it is in this active engagement (vita activa) that human 
freedom is most fully realized. Relevant as well is Friere’s (1970) critique of the oppressive impact of 
established knowledge, and the importance of a liberatory education. The latter would largely be realized 
in embodied action. More recently, we may draw from Ingold’s (2011) characterization of life in terms of 
continuous becoming, a conception in which our major challenges are found within the emerging and ever 
shifting conditions of moment-to-moment existence. 
 How should research be constituted in this future forming orientation? I shall later explore the 
possibilities more fully. However, as a preparatory spur, I return to classic research by developmental 
psychologist Harry Harlow.  In his early studies Harlow and his colleagues (Harlow, Dodsworth and 
Harlow, 1965) demonstrated that macaque monkeys reared in social isolation for six months suffered 
severe deficits in every aspect of their subsequent behavior with other monkeys. This research was 
consistent with a broad literature on infant attachment, and was widely used to celebrate a biological 
account of attachment needs. In effect, the research functioned to mirror the common conceptions of infant 
development. Later, however, Harlow and Suomi (1971) challenged this nomothetically based inquiry by 
wondering if they might find a way to reverse these seemingly permanent deficits. Ultimately they 
discovered that if they allowed the six-month isolates to play freely with a three-month-old normal 
monkey, they could eliminate the effects of isolation. The research orientation effectively shifted from the 
given to the imaginary, and with significant results.  
 By the same token, rather than demonstrating humankind’s common failings in cognitive 
processing (Kahneman, Slovic and Twersky, 1982), what if research were directed to erasing the biases; 
rather than searching for the determinants of depression (Altemus, 2006), inquiry were launched into 
means of escaping or avoiding depression; rather than revealing the suffering experienced by immigrants 
(Sayad, 2004), inquiry were directed to advancing immigrant well-being; rather than focusing on the way 
discourse functions to foster “otherness” (Tekin, 2010 ), the emphasis were placed on how discourse can 
be used to foster mutuality; and, rather than documenting the many failings attributed to age (Mani, 
Bedwell, and Miller, 2005), researchers explored ways to stimulate late-life flowering? More broadly, 
rather than illuminating the corrosive effects of poverty, researchers attempted to develop job programs; 
rather than documenting the persistence of hunger, the sciences set out to eradicate hunger; rather than 
focusing on the causes war, scientists joined in erecting impediments to war. 
 I shall shortly expand on the contours of future forming research. Before doing so, however, there 
are two preliminary matters of importance. The first concerns metaphysical assumptions and the second 
contemporary world conditions, both of which add substantial weight to the present proposal.  
 
           Social Research in Metaphysical Context 
 
All inquiry is informed either directly or indirectly by certain assumptions or enabling agreements, 
whether in the form a metaphysical background or fully articulated ontologies. It is to these metaphysical 
underpinnings that I direct attention in this case, as the shift from mirroring to making presages what could 
be understood as a profound shift in the conception of knowledge.  If fully expanded, this shift would 
carry with it equally significant implications for social science inquiry. As we have come to understand 
scientific knowledge, its goal is to illuminate a subject matter in such a way that its outcomes will benefit 
future action. Traditionally this benefit is couched in the language of prediction and control, but in a less 
pronounced way may be found in all mirroring research. But what must be assumed about the nature of 
this subject matter to render such a goal plausible? At least one characteristic would seem to be the 
character of endurance. That is, the subject matter must be sufficiently enduring (repetitive or replicable) 
that useful knowledge can be established.  When we can presume the enduring existence of a subject 
matter, we can properly begin to measure, generalize, and predict. The very concept of research enshrines 
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the assumption, suggesting that the object of our gaze remains stable, such that we can return to “search” 
again. In re/search, assumptions about the subject matter can be vindicated or vanquished, and useful 
generalizations or insights may be shared.   
 In significant respects this assumption of perdurance represents a continuation of a metaphysical 
tradition with origins in early Greek philosophy, and most especially in the works of Aristotle and Plato. 
Both sought to justify a belief in a cosmos of permanent or substantial forms. For Plato the forms exist as 
pure ideals; for Aristotle the substantial forms serve to organize matter such that it has recognizable 
properties. On this view, knowledge may endure or be accumulated over time. Yet, one may also see these 
views as attempts to answer questions implicit in an earlier metaphysics of impermanence. This 
metaphysics is most centrally attributed to Heraclitus. For Heraclitus, “Everything changes and nothing 
remains still.” On this account, however, the possibility of accumulating knowledge is dim.  Recognizing 
the sensory or empirical justification for the Heracletian view, the challenge was to develop a more 
reassuring alternative; thus a metaphysics of an essence somewhere behind or beyond the empirically 
evident. There are many reasons for the flourishing of the Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics in 
Western history, not only in terms of its supportive role in Christian theology, but as justification for a 
vision of science as a cumulative undertaking. It is not until the nineteenth century – in the work of Hegel 
(1832) and Bergson (1911) - among others, that there was a significant re-emergence of interest in process, 
possibly culminating in Whitehead’s 1929 work, Process and reality.  
 While attempts to justify a given metaphysics are ultimately doomed to an infinite regress of 
justification, it is useful to address the question of pragmatic potentials.  If the presumption of permanence 
is optional, what is gained or lost in the social sciences by sustaining its embrace? Concomitantly, what are 
the potential consequences of a metaphysics of change? As I am proposing, the limitations in the 
traditional orientation are substantial; the potentials of a process-oriented metaphysics are rich and largely 
unexplored. In this light, it is useful to consider what appear to be our contemporary world conditions.  
 
    Research in a World of Flux 
 
It is perhaps a signal of the times that anthropologists find it increasingly difficult to locate stable, 
geographically isolated cultures for ethnographic research. Rather, attentions turn increasingly to global 
flows, dispersions, transient sub-cultures, and identity conflicts (Clifford, 1997; Appadurai, 2001). As one 
might say, the traditional “objects of study” are slowly dissolving.  Is it possible, we may ask, that this is 
the coming condition for all the social sciences? In light of the impact of communication technologies on 
cultural life, such a conclusion seems eminently plausible. For roughly a century we have seen the 
flourishing of technologies that intensify, complexify, and accelerate the processes of communication. 
Beginning with the radio, the automobile, mass transportation systems, and mass publishing in early 
twentieth century, and subsequently adding jet transportation, television, the internet, and the cell phone, 
the landscape of human interchange is radically altered. All such technologies function to create, sustain, 
or subvert forms of understanding or belief, with the result that worlds of meaning are in continuous 
motion – with modifications, absorptions, clashes, and creations occurring incessantly and instantaneously 
around the globe. If human action is significantly dependent on negotiated agreements among people, as 
suggested earlier, then stable traditions are everywhere under siege.  
 Such shifts in world conditions have been the subject of wide-ranging scholarly concern.  
Berman’s (1983), All that is solid melts into air: The experience of modernity, and Hardison’s (1990) 
Disappearing through the skylight: Culture and technology in the twentieth century, were bell-weathers. 
My own work, The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in everyday life, subsequently focused on the 
impact of technology on conceptions of self. And in more recent times, there are, for example, the works 
of Eitzen and Zinn (2011) on changes in society resulting from massive globalization; Rogers (2011) on 
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the “age of fracture”; Bauman (2011) on the emerging “liquidity” of human relationships, and Giddens 
(2000) on the way globalization is reshaping our lives. These are, of course, working propositions, but 
they pose a formidable question. If we find ourselves in a world where increasingly unpredictable 
fluctuation marks every facet of life - from self-conception, family life, and community to global 
configurations of power, economy, and illness - what is the place of a research tradition that attempts to 
mirror a stable state of affairs? In what sense can we sustain an assumption of progress in knowledge?  As 
I am proposing, the more promising vista lies in a science that engages in the very shaping of the 
directions of change. 
     
      Toward Future Forming Research 
 
We move now to consider the contours of research from a future forming perspective. In my view the most 
productive route in this case is not to embark on a disjunctive, imaginary world– a world of inquiry 
beyond the reach of contemporary researchers. Rather, it would seem more promising to examine current 
and emerging practices with future forming potential. If such practices can be illuminated in terms of this 
potential, a new consciousness may be germinated.  New and more potent practices may be stimulated. In 
certain respects, then, the present offering may serve as a mid-wife to a movement in the making. A voice 
may be given to an otherwise unarticulated sensibility, thus giving form and function to future 
undertakings. In this light, I wish to consider three forms of inquiry with prescient potential. 
  
Inquiry as Incitement  
 
Emerging in the 1930’s, the critical movement in the social sciences has now spawned multiple sites of 
activity across the disciplines. One might well see this work as tissued to the Enlightenment tradition of 
truth seeking. For example, the empiricist’s truth claims might be pitted against those of the critical realist 
in terms of “getting it right” about the world. However, there are more subtle ways in which the critical 
movement lends itself to the future forming vision developed here.  As outlined in the earlier discussion of 
consequential constatives, and reflected more fully in the liberatory movement more generally (Martin-
Baro, 1994; Watkins & Shulman, 2010), the attempt is to draw critical attention to existing ways of life, 
and to engender a critical consciousness from which social change might spring. The hope is that “seeing 
with new eyes” can incite resistance to the status quo. 
 While the greatest share of critical work today is arguably theoretical, there is wide ranging 
research devoted to liberatory ends. The methodological options for doing such work are unbounded. Even 
laboratory experimentation has been used for such purposes. Both the classic work of Asch (1956) and 
Milgram (1963) had far less to do with hypothesis testing, as it informed generations of students of the 
dangers of conformity and obedience. However, today one of the most well developed forms of research is 
critical discourse analysis. Here the intention is to illuminate forms of language use that variously serve to 
oppress, discriminate, dominate, or function in other socially corrosive ways. Inspired especially by 
liberatory ideas, the goal of such research is to free the reader from traditional or common-sense ways of 
constructing the world. For example, Coates (2013) illuminates the way group prejudices are normalized 
in everyday discourse on heterosexuality; Simpson and Mayr (2010) showcase the various ways in which 
language is used to generate power differences; and Breeze (2012) demonstrates the rhetorical strategies 
by which corporations legitimate their malfeasance. Willig’s (1999) edited volume, Applied discourse 
analysis, features critical analyses of the taken-for-granted assumptions in self-help literature, reproductive 
technologies, psychiatric medication, and sex education. 
 Yet, there are also substantial limits to critical research in its future forming potentials. Although 
challenging the status quo, the tradition has done far less to fertilize visionary potentials. The critical skills 
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are well honed, but the imaginary register is seldom explored. There are several unfortunate outcomes. On 
the one side, critical work typically discredits its targets (the powerful, colonialists, men, psychiatrists). 
While inciting resistance, the pejorative rhetoric galvanizes its opposition and lends itself to increased 
polarization. Further, the potential audience for critical work can too easily predict the outcomes. The 
likelihood of finding in such work a balanced weighing of competing views is slim. Critical scholars have 
also turned their weapons on each other (e.g. realists vs. constructionists, feminist factionalism, the gender 
blindness of Marxism). And, while not a principled limitation, most critical research is also limited to 
academic journals and monographs. The rhetorical genres inherent in these traditions, are either wearisome 
or impenetrable to the public at large. Too often, critique remains hermetically distanced from the 
surrounding culture. 
 In this latter light, there is considerable promise to be found in the performative movement in 
social science (see Gergen & Gergen, 2012). Much of this work is lodged in the premise discussed earlier, 
that whatever there is makes no necessary demands on the language of representation. In this light, 
questions open as to the necessity of using traditional genres of scientific writing. Here critics weigh in on 
the failure of academic writing to be understood or appreciated by the greater public. As often voiced, such 
writing is elitist, and serves only to increase the power of those who are privileged by virtue of education 
and class. The performative orientation opens the way to exploring multiple forms of writing, including for 
example the use of short stories, poetry, autobiography, collaborative writing, and more. Other researchers 
explore the potentials of representation beyond writing. As it is argued, why not enable the social sciences 
to make use of the full range of communicative acts, including theater, art, music, photography, multi-
media, and more. Critical researchers in the performative domain are thus advantaged by a powerful array 
of rhetorical means by which they can reach a larger public with far greater impact. For example, 
researchers have variously performed what it is like to “come out” as a homosexual (Saldaña, 2011), to be 
ostracized as an aging woman (Gergen, M., 2012), or to be dehumanized in receiving treatment for 
metastasized cancer (Gray & Sinding, 2002). Yet, even in expanding on the future forming potentials of 
inquiry, performative work is limited. Audiences are generally small – often restricted to academic 
gatherings. And, while entertained, enlightened, or moved within the space of the performance, one can 
only conjecture about the resulting outcomes in action.  
 
Research as Creative Construction 
 
A more pronounced step toward developing future-altering research is represented by a disparate range of 
researchers attempting to build or create new “forms of life.” Embracing more fully a vision of knowledge 
through praxis, they set out to create replicable practices that achieve value-invested goals. The aim is not 
to illuminate existing problems in society, but to devise practices that can achieve better or more viable 
outcomes. Such an orientation has been especially appealing in fields specifically confronted with 
practical challenges (e.g. education, organizational development, health-care, mental health, conflict 
reduction). In many of these domains the traditional attempt to solve problems through scientific research 
has been frustrating or ineffective. Traditional research is often dedicated to substantiating theoretical 
propositions; however, there is no obvious means of deriving from abstract propositions actions relevant to 
specific circumstances. Even when research is designed to solve a particular problem, it is troubled by the 
narrow range of selected variables, ambiguities in measurement, conflicts among statistical models, and 
multiple interpretations of findings, all in a context of continuously fluctuating conditions.  Traditional 
research yields no trustworthy or commanding path to the future. The result among practitioners is an 
increasing sense that “The best way to predict the future is to create it.” 
 A dramatic illustration of this orientation is provided by scholars at Case Western Reserve. 
Drawing from narrative and constructionist ideas, they created an alternative to traditional practices of 
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scientific management.  The tradition of gathering systematic data on organizational functioning, from 
which executives should derive optimal decisions, had always been precarious. In this contrasting 
orientation, organizational participants collectively determine the optimal course of organizational 
development (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005). This practice, called appreciative inquiry, first gives 
expression to the individual stories of organizational participants, and from these expressions, locates 
common values. From these values, new directions for the organization are derived, and new policies and 
practices put in place. To illustrate, in an organization in which there is disabling conflict (e.g union vs. 
management, males vs. females), participants from each side of the conflict may be paired off, and invited 
to share stories of a time in which they worked together amicably and productively. The pairs then join 
larger groups, in which they share the best of the stories. This sharing replaces the discourse of mutual 
blame, and generates confidence that a better future may be created. From this sharing the groups locate 
visions of ideal relationships, from which they derive policies and practices that would realize these ideals. 
The stage is then set for putting the plans and practices in motion. “Problem talk” is replaced by dialogue 
with an appreciative focus. Practices of appreciative inquiry have proved so effective that they have now 
been used by major corporations, national governments (to generate a new constitution in Nepal), groups 
attempting to create a United Religions organization (paralleling the United Nations), along with countless 
local groups – large and small – throughout the world. This orientation to decision making is now heralded 
as the “new wave” in organizational development (Marshak & Grant, 2008).  
 This more pro-active approach to research can be found in many other practice oriented fields of 
inquiry. For example, confronted with an increasing volume of hospitalized psychiatric patients and 
pharmaceutical prescriptions, an innovative group in Finland (Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006) decided to 
abandon the traditional psychiatric evaluation procedure. In its place they created a practice called open 
dialogue. Rather than relying on the single diagnosis of a psychiatrist - which would ultimately require 
defining the problem in terms of a mental illness – open meetings were arranged in which a range of 
stakeholders could participate. This might include, for example, a psychiatrist, parents, a social worker, a 
teacher, a clergy member and the “designated patient”. All would join in discussing the nature of the 
problem and possible forms of alleviation. This dialogue group would continue to meet during the 
treatment process. The result was a dramatic decrease in the number of hospital beds occupied and reliance 
on pharmaceuticals. In the field of health-care, the work of Charon (2008) and others has responded to 
critiques of medical interviewing, in which the patient is so often treated instrumentally – as a mere object 
to be diagnosed and treated by scientific means. As an alternative, new practices of medical evaluation 
were created in which patients share their personal lives (life narratives), a practice resulting in a more 
caring and clinically sensitive relationships between doctor and patient. In the field of conflict resolution, 
scholars have pressed forward to build a variety of new practices. In the case of the highly successful 
public conversations project (Herzig & Chasin, 2005), for example, a form of conversation was crafted 
that enables participants to express their convictions in a way that could be more sympathetically absorbed 
by their opponents. This conversational practice has been used to quell otherwise intense conflicts on 
abortion rights, gun rights, homosexuality, religion, and more.  
 In all these domains, we have a form of research in which knowledge is acquired through the 
complex and creative process of constructing a successful practice (see also Hassan, 2014; and Kahane 
2012). When such knowledge is shared, it becomes a resource for others. There is also a manner in which 
such research is cumulative. As multiple practices are generated, they provide alternatives from which one 
can select as best fits local needs (see, for example, Bojer, Roehl, & Knuth, 2008), or from which new 
hybrids can be formed. A collation of practices on peace building, for example, provides what amounts to 
a “vocabulary” from which new practices can emerge.    
 
Research as Collaborative Action  
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The potentials of inquiry into future building practices are enormous. However, one limitation of this 
genre lies in the fact that the capacity for creation remains primarily in the hands of the research 
community. Would it be possible, one asks, to enhance the potential of the populace to experiment more 
creatively in developing alternatives to unwanted conditions? This is all the more important because the 
efficacy of newly developed practices is indeterminate. For example, with constant repetition, the meaning 
of dialogue can shift; conversations once absorbing in their spontaneity now become programmatic and 
subject to strategizing. This is especially relevant, for example, to peace building practices. Knowledge of 
a dialogic practice renders it subject to manipulation.  
 One highly promising alternative to practice building is represented in the attempt of an increasing 
range of researchers to work collaboratively with those outside the academy in achieving social change. 
More formally, such efforts are termed action research. Although early action research was largely 
confined to issues of social justice, within the past decade the scope and variations have significantly 
escalated (see Reason & Bradbury, 2008). Much of this work shares in a conception of practice based – as 
opposed to propositional – knowing, as discussed earlier. Most interesting, however, is a shift within the 
action research community from a conception of knowledge as an individual possession, to knowledge as 
inhering within relations among people. On this account, the coordinated activities of persons bring about 
what may be viewed as an organization that thinks, learns, or processes information (see for example, 
Salomon, 1997; Engestrom, 2010).  It is in this context that many organizational scholars share an interest 
in communities of practice, and especially relevant to the present offering, learning communities 
 This is not the context for a broad review of the many forms and sites of action research. However, 
a brief scanning of cases can illustrate the potentials of research in the service of future forming. As 
mentioned, much action research has been used in the service of social justice. Thus, researchers have 
joined with women in prison to gain their rights (Fine & Torres, 2006), organized innovative resistance to 
anti-gay legislation (Russell & Bohan, 1999), and worked with organizations to develop participatory 
democracy (Karlsson, 1969). Other researchers have expanded the scope of action research to include the 
enhancement of community well-being. For example, Lykes (2001) has worked with Guatemalan women 
to help them build community after debilitating conflict, and UNICEF has initiated action research to 
develop communication strategies for preventing HIV/AIDS among adolescents in Bosnia Herzegovina 
(Maglajlic & Tiffany, 2006).  
 Various professional fields have also launched collaborative action initiatives. In the field of 
education, for example, teachers are learning how to view their classroom as laboratories for participatory 
research (Wamba, 2011).  In medicine, action research has been used in a variety of settings, to improve 
healthcare, create collaborative relations among staff, and improve understanding of patients (Waterman, 
et al. 2001). In the field of management, researchers are working with large companies to foster 
collaborative inquiry. In one major undertaking, for example, researchers collaborated with an agency in 
the US government, employing over 200,000 people, to successfully reduce workplace stress (Kowalski et 
al, 2003). In more expansive work, action research initiatives are being used to bring entire regions or 
countries into collaborative inquiry. Much of this work has involved creating dialogic connections among 
large institutions of business, education, and government for purposes of broad development (Gustafson, 
Finne and Oscarrson, 2001).   
 These three registers of inquiry – liberatory, practice producing, and action centered – illustrate the 
substantial potentials inherent in a future making orientation to research. In my view they carry with them 
the early winds of change, harbingers of a significant transformation in the conception of knowledge and 
the practice of social research. Now invited is a further exercise of the imagination, extending and 
expanding the vision of inquiry. There are promising possibilities, for example, in linking researchers with 
the creativity by design movement in the technological sphere. More broadly, one might explore the 
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possibility of researchers working with governments to experiment with new and more viable forms of 
governance? Or, might it profit the world to have at its disposal a body of researchers whose talents were 
available to work creatively with conflicted parties? With education in the science of world making, and 
the broad dissemination of successful innovations, perhaps we could escape the logic of determinism and 
begin to realize the potential of collaboratively fashioning the future. 
 There are also important socio-political implications in this shift toward inquiry as future making. 
One of the major problems with the mirroring tradition is that conclusions about existing conditions have 
little impact on societal well-being. This is not only because the forms of discourse shared within the 
professions are largely unavailable or inaccessible to those outside, but the truth posits of the profession 
are highly vulnerable to critique on methodological grounds. The laboratory situations created for 
“testing” general hypotheses are typically remote from everyday life. The samples used in Western social 
science are often faulted as WEIRD (biased in terms of the Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and 
democratic samples). On the level of policy making, politicians are free to select from the available 
findings as fits their purposes. Conservative politicians often dismiss social science research altogether 
because of what they properly see as liberal bias. Others find traditional research results insensitive to the 
currents of social change; as it is said, social science research is “journalism in slow motion.” In contrast, 
the significance of a future forming orientation to inquiry doesn’t rest on generalized truth posits, so much 
as active achievements. That one could demonstrate a means for reducing a local conflict between police 
and the citizenry, coordinating the activities of a hospital staff, enabling an urban community to reduce 
crime, reducing pathological symptoms without pharmaceuticals, or reducing suicide through new 
technologies, would represent the fruits of inquiry. Nor does such research depend for its importance on 
the dynamics of political life. Social research in a future forming mode unsettles the structure of political 
power. Researchers themselves become agents of social change.  
    
   Theory in a World of Change 
 
The present offering has almost exclusively focused on practices of research as opposed to theoretical 
work in the social sciences. Of course, one might argue that theoretical work is itself a form of research, 
but for present purposes it is useful to honor the traditional theory/research distinction. And too, all 
research carries with it premises or assumptions that may be viewed as theoretical. At the same time, there 
are scholarly enclaves across the social sciences primarily devoted to scholarly deliberation, and in which 
active research of the traditional sort is virtually absent. Before concluding the present paper, a brief 
reflection on the potentials of theoretical inquiry is useful.  
 At the outset, we can distinguish between the function of theory within the traditional vision of a 
mirroring science, and its potentials within the future making register. The chief functions of theory in 
traditional social science are primarily to integrate and synthesize findings, observations and 
interpretations from the broad domain of research; to provide a framework from which to mount fresh 
inquiry (bearing on the ultimate viability or truth value of the theory); and to offer the society an account 
of the world from which useful applications can be derived. Iconic here are Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
Einstein’s relativity theory, and Watson, Crick, and Maurice’s double helix. Whether such a view is 
conceptually adequate, or the degree to which is it applicable to the social sciences are questions of 
longstanding debate. Most important here, however, is the question of how such an approach to theory 
functions in terms of its future making potentials.   
 There is no simple answer to this question, and for several reasons. Within the social sciences the 
presence of research findings has seldom served as a major impetus for theoretical conjecture. Although 
observations play a role in the classic theoretical works of Durkheim, Mead, Freud, Piaget, or Parsons, for 
example, there is little reliance on systematic research. Indeed, most such theories function as foundational 
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statements about the nature of human action. Although more limited in scope, much the same can said of 
more recent theorists, such as Garfinkel, Goffman, Bruner, Harré, Honneth, and Maffesoli. As a result of 
this relative independence from what might otherwise be considered “established fact,” the theorist is less 
constrained by commonly shared assumptions about social life. This liberation from the sedimented 
realities grants the theorist liberty to construct new and challenging intelligibilities.  In my opinion, to the 
extent that such intelligibilties have inspired research in the social sciences, the outcome for society has 
been modest. This is largely owing to the above discussed separation of the research community from the 
society at large. At the same time, however, there is a large range of professions –education, mental health, 
social work, organizational consulting – hungry for orienting ideas and often eager for new ideas from 
which they may draw advantage. The work of these more imaginative theorists thus finds fertile ground. 
Thus for example, in Piaget and Inhelder’s (1969) work, we find a significant impact on educational 
practices; Luhmann’s (1996) systems theory and subsequent complexity theory are reflected in 
organizational development practices; Foucault’s writing (1979) has had a significant impact on 
therapeutic practices. In effect, such theoretical formulations may significantly affect society without any 
reliance on traditional practices of verification/falsification.    
 Yet, in terms of future forming potential, it is unlikely that most of these theorists set out to alter 
the course of social life. While influential, the effects were more often inadvertent. What possibilities are 
open, then, when the theorist indeed intends to use his/her work to affect society? Certainly Marxist theory 
– in its heady mixture of description and prescription - represents a beacon in this respect. Critical theory, 
feminist theory, and post-colonial theory all carry the revolutionary traces of the Marxist movement. The 
extent to which such theory is successful in escaping the confines of academia remains open to debate.  
Recent attempts to change individualist ideology have been coupled with developments in relational 
theory (Gergen, 2009; Kirschner & Martin, 2010). Here theorists attempt to replace the traditional 
understanding of society as constituted by individual units or persons, with a vision of relational process 
from which the very idea of individual persons may (or not) emerge. Relational theory now moves slowly 
into practices of education, therapy and organizational development.  In sum, in future deliberations on the 
possibility of a future making science, social theorists must be given a significant seat at the table.  
 
       Concluding Challenges 
 
The proposed vision of the researcher as an active agent in fashioning the future raises many questions, 
both conceptual and practical. On the conceptual side, there remains the challenge of more fully enriching 
the conception of knowledge from a process standpoint. As we have seen, there are promising fragments 
available, from early Greek philosophy to the present. And one can generate a plausible case for a form of 
process knowledge that focuses on the ways in the continuous engagement in action fashions one’s future 
undertakings. More radically, the way is open to refiguring what we are calling propositional knowledge 
as a limited form of process knowledge. “Knowing that” may be viewed as a specialized form of 
“knowing how,” with claims to the former masking their dependency on the unarticulated process from 
which they derive. However, a more adequate account of the terrain would do much to give form and 
direction to the kinds of endeavors treated here. Closely related is the concept of education, commonly 
viewed as the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next. One might justifiably argue that 
the traditional focus on the mastery of existing knowledge is relatively ineffectual; after all, one’s recall of 
long-ago lessons is notoriously unreliable.  More importantly, in a world of rapid and unpredictable flux, 
the focus on what is the case has limited potential. The challenge is that of rapidly synthesizing multiple 
sources of information, and moving improvisationally in a context of ambiguity. Required is a more fully 
developed account of education as a continuous enrichment in capacities for skillful innovation, not in the 
service of adaptation, but in terms of bringing about a viable future. 
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 At the same time, I see within the future forming frame, a renewal and re/visioning of the moral 
dimension of inquiry. Most researchers within the mirroring tradition escape significant deliberation of 
such issues, with the claim that the rigorous illumination of what is the case will somehow benefit the 
world. While critical theorists have provided teeming illustrations of the ideological saturation of social 
research, and others have continued to enrich our understanding of the moral dimensions of social inquiry 
(e.g. Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon, 1999; Brinkmann, 2011), the relevant research communities seem 
unaffected. Most research traditions continue with little reflection on their ideological or moral 
implications. However, if the vision of research as a future forming endeavor is more fully realized, there 
is little escaping deliberation on such issues. This is so because in specifying those future conditions to 
which one’s efforts are dedicated, one is fundamentally addressing issues of value.  To responsibly address 
the question of “to what kind of future can I contribute,” is to face complex questions of the good. “For 
whom would such an achievement be valuable; for whom would it be oppressive; what are we to do with 
multiple traditions of the good?” The traditional claim that science is concerned with what is, rather than 
what ought to be, is now reversed.  
 In my view, the logic developed in the present offering would also add significant dimension to 
such deliberations. Issues of moral choice are traditionally linked to the individual actor. It is the 
individual who acquires moral worth by virtue of his/her choices. There are close associations between 
this view and the ocularist tradition in science. The metaphor of the lone figure of Galileo heroically 
confronting the church, lends tacit support to an individualist view of moral decision-making. The 
question of “ought” is thus a personal one: “what future do I value?” However, there is an important way 
in which the logic developed here shifts the site of moral choice from the individual to the relational 
sphere. The key point is embedded in the earlier proposition that to know about a given form of behavior 
opens the possibility of its being done (or not). Inhering in this view is an understanding of human action 
as issuing from shared intelligibilities. By and large, we go about our lives in ways that “make sense” 
within the relations in which we participate – simultaneously reflecting and potentially transforming 
tradition. From this standpoint, activities become valuable, worthwhile, or moral from within relational 
activity. Whether it is devoting oneself to video games or to martyrdom, the origins of action lie within the 
realm of relationships. It follows from this position that one cannot principally ask about the value of one’s 
research as a moral atom, a lone decision maker. What pass for individual decisions are essentially social 
actions removed from their birthplace in the swarm. 
 That moral proclivities have their roots in social traditions is scarcely a new idea (MacIntyre, 1981; 
Alexander, 2002). However, the implications for deliberating on the outcomes of research do take a new 
turn. We live in a world of competing and conflicting moral traditions. The values represented in any 
research endeavor are inherently vulnerable. It is insufficient, then, to rest the case for one’s inquiry on a 
single moral tradition. When this tradition is set against all others, the stage is set for an interminable 
conflict of principles. And as contemporary world conditions attest, such conflict is lethal in consequence. 
As we find, a multiplication of goods sets the stage for mutual eradication – or the end of morality 
altogether. Choices concerning the future building outcomes of research should not, then, be matters of 
personal integrity but of relational responsibility – responsibility to the social process out of which 
morality emerges. As proposed elsewhere (Gergen, 2009) given multiple traditions of the good, moral 
decision-making might ideally rest on dialogic process – a deliberation among relevant parties. We 
approach a social pragmatics of morality.  
 In conclusion, let me suggest that the significance of the natural sciences in society was not derived 
from their claims to superiority in matters of truth, but in their contribution to the affairs of everyday life. 
The dramatic investments in science that marked the twentieth century were largely due to the outcomes of 
such inquiry for curing diseases, harnessing energy, making more effective weapons, creating better 
building materials, and so on. In effect, the valorization of scientific knowledge derived not from its 
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propositions but from its societal outcomes. In my view the social sciences have been all too enamored 
with the role of truth making, thus thrusting the concern for cultural contribution into a secondary position. 
We have perhaps naively believed that when our words are inscribed in the journals and books of the 
disciplines, that such inscriptions will be carried in the minds and hearts of the populace. It is the thrust of 
the present proposal to reverse the investment – to undertake research as a form of social action, with the 
words following after. We live in a world in which religious and political conflict threaten the globe, 
governments are dysfunctional, communities are eroding, longstanding cultural traditions are evaporating, 
and we struggle with our relationships to our habitat – both natural and technological. It is time for the 
social sciences to channel their substantial resources of intelligence and ingenuity into creating more 
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